Introduction
Dempster-Shafer (hereafter, DS) theory of evidence is a mathematical setting for expressing the strength of our belief over a set of possible hypotheses (Shafer, 1976; Smets, 1988) . In a nutshell, a unitary amount of belief ("belief mass') is distributed among the subsets of a set 8 of (exhaustive and mutually exclusive) hypotheses, called the frame of discernment. A Basic Probability Assignment (BPA) over 8 is a function specifying how heavy a mass of belief is being allocated to each of its subsets. A belief junction bel,. is then defmed on the subsets of 8: intuitively, bel,.(A) measures the maxi mum amount of belief that can be allocated to A accord ing tom. Two BPA's on the same space of hypotheses, corresponding to two distinct bodies of evidence, may be combined into a new BPA by means of Dempster's rule of combination. Acquisition of new evidence is typically performed by combining a pre-existing BPA with a new BPA representing the impact of the new evidence alone. A most popular use of DS theory in AI is well exemplified by what has been called the "multivariate formalism" (Kong, 1986) : the problem we want to deal with is represented through a number of variables, associated to the relevant elements of the problem. Each variable is allowed to take a number of alternative values, and BPA's are defmed over the sets of these values. A relation among different elements is expressed by defming a BPA on the product space of the (values of the) corresponding variables. Once we
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have modelled a problem this way, a DS solution is found by computing an overall BPA-the combination of all the available BPA's (i.e. those expressing prior belief, those expressing relations, and those expressing acquired evidence)-on the overall space of values for all the variables. From this BPA, a measure of belief for the (sets ot) values of each interesting variable can be computed.
Expressive power and epistemic adequacy have often been acknowledged to DS theory in AI. Unfortunately, uncertainty representation is but one side of the problem of formalizing uncertain knowledge: in particular, the knowledge itself, which uncertainty refers to, has to be represented. If we take the point of view of Knowledge Representation (KR), we may drive the conclusion that DS theory is not an adequate tool for expressing general or domain specific knowledie . Different types of knowledge have continuously bee n identified in the KR tradition (see e.g. Israel & Brachman, 1981; Brachman & Levesque, 1982) ; to wit, the four statements -Elephants are manunals with four legs -All of my friends like jazz music -Normally, birds fly -Smoke suggests fire express four qualitatively different types of knowledge. A number of efforts have normally been devoted in KR to the development of representation formalisms able to capture (and discriminate) different types of knowl edge. Yet, in aDS framework, all the four statements above would most probably be expressed by a single pattern, namely a BPA on the product space of two ap propriate variables (or a conditional belief function bel(AIB) over it). Moreover, representing even simple patterns of generic knowledge in a DS framework may become highly problematic: e.g., consider representing the fact that parents are humans that have at least one child (notice that this fact would be easily represented in most KR system).
In this paper we try to blm DS theory to KR. We do this by defming a formal framework which uses OS theory for representing strength of belief about our knowledge, and the linguistic structures of an arbitrary KR language for representing the knowledge itself. The key concept consists in the distinction between the lan guage we use for representing knowledge, peculiar of the given KR system, and the knowledge actually rep resented. This knowledge will be modelled by abstract objects (propositions), and belief about it will be expressed as BPA's on these objects (rather than on the sentences of the KR language). As a consequence\ our framework will be independent of the particular KR system we intend to use, regarded as a parameter. In order to settle down our framework in a general way, we will adhere to the "functional approach" advocated by Levesque (1984) , and define "Dempster-Shafer
Belief Bases" as abstract data types representing a (uncertainly) believed corpus of knowledge. In them, knowledge and belief about this knowledge will be rep resented according to a specific KR language and to DS theory, respectively.
The rest paper is organized as follows. 2. The Objects of Belief In introducing our framework in the above section, the word "knowledge" has been used in two ways: to de note the objects which we entertain belief in; and to de note the objects represented by a KR language. We analyse in this section how these "objects" can be modelled in an abstract way, and how they can become the link between DS theory and a KR system. We identify items of knowledge with elements of a set 'f of "propositions"t. In order for 'f to be a good candidate for our goal, we actually require it to be a Boolean algebra; we denote by � its partial order, by
(1 its infimum, by c its complement, and by U. and 0 its top and bottom elements, respectively. Given ele ments P and Q of , , we read "P � Q" as P logically entails Q, "P (i Q" as the conjunction of P and Q, Cp as the negation of P, U. as the tautology and 0 as the fa lse proposition of 'f. Propositions are the right objects to asses belief to, so we will defme a DS calculus on 'f in the next section. However, we want to express our knowledge through the sentences of a generic KR language: the problem we face is then how to map sen tences of this language to the propositions they con note. We will suggest that providing this mapping ac tually constitutes the role of the KR system in the 1 We remind that, after Frege, the.p,opo$ition connoled by a sentence is its $erLJe, its �aning. The reader should never con fuse prop<lli tioos with sentences which express them; nor should she confuse them with propositional symbols, or any other ayn sactical element of any pven language. Propositions are the � tm11 of the sentences. framework that we are defining; but we flJ'St need to spend a few words on KR systems and their semantics.
The most popular way to formally describe a KR system ! is to defme a formal system based on the lan guage � :t of I:. There are basically two approaches to formalizing such a system, namely the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic ones. The first approach consists in providing a truth relation lo I. for I., which defmes the notion of "truth" of sentences of � :t with re spect to elements of a given class of mathematical structures, used as models of the language. The second approach consists in providing I: with a deduction rela tion 1-:t that specifies which sentences can be deduced by which ones through the deductive apparatus of I:
(normally a set of axioms and inference rules 
Dempster-Shaler's Belief Bases
In proposing his "functional approach to Knowledge Representation", Levesque (1984) erations that can be made on them; typical operations are a query operation "Ask", an update operation "Tell", and an initialization operation "Empty". Adapting Levesque's suggestion to the case of uncer tain knowledge, we will defme "Dempster-Shafer's Belief Bases" (or "Belief Bases'') as abstract data types where knowledge and belief about this knowledge are represented according to a specific KR language and to OS theory, respectively. Belief Bases for a given KR system l: will be characterized by three primitive opera tions (13,13, denotes the class of Belief Bases) : for the asked proposition3 and its complement, respec tively; and Tell t [a,<xttxr>,lC] will return the new BPA obtained by combining, by Dempster's combina tion, the old BPA 1C with a BPA representing a piece of evidence saying: «I believe to a degree Xt that ex is true, and to a degree xr that it is false". Before going to the formal defmition, we need to restate some of the basic elements of DS theory in terms of our generic Boolean algebra � (with =>, f"'l, c, U and 0 as above) and of sets of pairs <P, mp>4:
2 As reminded in the Introduction, the usual formulation of DS theory is given starting with a set 8 of hypotheses, and by then defining BPA's and belief functions over the power-set of 8 (which is a Boolean algebra). Here, on the contrary, we formu late the theory directly on a generic Boolean algebra J». The two formulations are equivalent 3 Short fell' "the proposition connoted by the asked sentence". 4 Bel (U) = 1 and Bel (0) = 0 will follow from clef. 3.3 below. 
. it is undefined otherwise; p 1 2 is given by:
p12 =1-I, mpomr for aii<P',m,.>e �e1 ,<P",m/'">E "2 sJ. P'nP"=0
}
We have now all the ingredients for giving the func tional definition of Belief Bases for a given KR system.
Def. 3.3. Let f> be a Boolean algebra of propositions as above. Let l: be a KR system and 11·111: a meaning function fo r 1:. Then Dempster-Shafer Belief Bases on I are defined by the fo llowing operations:
= lC 9 { <llcxll t ,Xt>, <cllcxll t ,Xf>, <U,1-XrXt>)
provided that, in TellD the evidence represented by a is distinct from that represented by 1C.
A Belief Base on I is built starting with Empty t [],
and then by performing successive Tel� operations on it Hence, as desired, a Belief Bases on l: turns out to be a set of a pairs <P, mp>, with Pe � and mpe [0,1], such that all the mp 's add up to 1. We interact with Belief Bases, via the above operations, by using � �of � t for expressing our knowledge, and num bers in (0,1] for expressing our belief in the truth (or falsity) of this knowledge. However, we emphasise once again that mass of belief is actually allocated to the propositions connoted by these sentences, and not to the sentences themselves. We will see examples of Belief Bases in the next sections. Nevertheless, just to keep the curiosity of the reader burning, we show here a typical use of a Belief Base where First Order Logic has bee n chosen to represent knowledge.
Belief Bases "behave well" as hybrid structures; that is, they preserve all the properties of both DS theory and the used KR system. For instance, we haveS: 
Modelling a Belief Base
We tum now to considering the problem of instantiating Belief Bases to particular cases of interest, i.e. to defme specific Belief Bases for some given KR system I. This is made in two steps: the fust step is to chose a particular way of modelling propositions, i.e. to defme the elements of the set f' and the relation => on it; the second step consists in defming a meaning function ll·l'r for the specific KR system we want to use, based on a suitable formalizati on of iL A fU"St possibility for modelling f', fairly usual in the logical tradition, is to identify a proposition with a set of possible worlds, namely those worlds in which that proposition holds. For the sake of generality, we con sider here Kripke structures6 of the form M = <SM, DM, VM, {1\M i I i � 0}>, where SM is a set of states, DM is a domain of individuals, V M is a mapping from symbols of � and states s• SM to elements (and sets) of DM, and the 1\ M/s are binary relations over SM. A Kripke (or "possible'') world is a pair <M,S> with s• SM. f' is then given by the power-set of the set of all Kripke worlds, equipped with the standard � relation.
5 Tbe proo fs of the.e results are given in the full paper.
6 Other mathematical sttuctures used to give semantics to lan guages could have been taken here. The reader unfamiliar with Kripkc structures is referred to e.g. (Hughes & Cress well , 1968 
Then we have, in Ks:
Ask[ flier(Tweety), Ks] = <.0.8, 0>
Ask[ flier(Cippy}, Ksl = <.0.8, 0>
and, in "6:
Ask[ flier(Cippy}, 1CJ = <.0.8, 0>
Ask[ excp(Tweety}, "6) = <1, 0> Ask[ excp(Cippy), "6) = <.0, 0.8> We switch now to a different way of modelling propositions. There are two reasons for doing this: to illustrate an alternative way to model Belief Sets (needed, e.g., if a proof-theoretic account of the KR system we want to use is available, rather than a model theoretic one); and to get closer to the practical side of Belief Bases (as we will discuss in the next Section). We will model propositions in terms of more "tangible" syntactical structures, rather than semantical ones.
Informally, given a sentence a. of � :E' we consider those sets of sentences of �I: such that a. is deducible from them in l:; the proposition connoted by a. in l:
consists of the collection of all these sets of sentences.
More formally, given a proof-theoretic account of a KR system l: = (�:E' 1-:E), we defme a possible argument in l: to be any consistent set of sentences of �:E.
In order to avoid unnecessary complexities, we also re-quire possible arguments to be non-redundant, i.e.
none of the sentences � in a possible argument 1t must be provable by the other sentences in 1t through 1-t. We denote by � t the set of all possible arguments in I:.
We then redefine the function ll · llt: �I-+ � in terms of of possible argumentsB:
Def.4.2. Let I: and � t be as above. Then, for each sentence a of �I' we let llafii =df {tte �I ltti-Ia } . Example 4. Any KR system for which a proo f theory is provided can be used to define Belief Bases, by defining II· III as in def. 4.2. So, we could textually repeat here Example 2 by using 1-I'Cll. instead of"" I'Cll. : the behaviour of the resulting Belief Bases would be exactly the same. As a matter of fact, the particular way propositions are modelled (and corre -8 When �t comprises a conjunction operator " satisfying " { a,ji) 1-y iff { aAji) 1-'f', and a disjunction operator v satisfying "{a}l-yOI' {ji)l-yiff {avji)l-'f', a (finite) set of possible argu ments {1tj I 1tj={liu ... . ,IJ i N i }} is equivalent to the sentence of �t " Vj(A j liip"· In this case, we could �nt propositions by sentences of �t' However, this is not ttuc in general.
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spondingly the way-model theoretic or proo f theoretic-in which the formalization of the KR system is given) is com pletely transparent to the user of the resulting Belief Bases.
A Stairway to Concreteness
We focus in this section on the practical side of Belief Bases: we discuss a possible architecture for a modular system embodying Belief Bases, and we consider a possible approach to its implementation. The proof-the oretic modelling of Belief Bases discussed above pro vides a hook for pursuing our program. In fact, switching from possible worlds to possible arguments allows us, by going down to the syntactic level, to get closer to the practical side of our Belief Bases9. We sketch a fll'St architecture for our system:
Ask

BB
In this architecture, the Belief Base is considered as an internally stored data structure (BB);
as a consequence, we use primitive operations 2. to let I: provide "fragments" of possible arguments, generated while performing inferences; the recon struction of full possible arguments from these fragments js then performed outside I:.
9 Formall y, this change is pretty iirelevant: possible worlds ac lUall y c:onespond to classes of equivalence of elements of Cli. 10 N otice that the full set Cli for a langlllg e with n atomic sen tences will in general comprise at least 22" elements. Step 1 implies that � must access BB to decide which (possible) inferences to draw in order to find "reasonable" possible arguments (alternatively, knowl edge in BB may be cached in a Knowledge Base internal to�). To exemplify, only those possible arguments in Cl * could be considered at any moment, where Cl * is the subset of Cl t comprising only the sentences which have occurre d up to now in a Tell operation. The effect of this is to drastically reduce the average number and size of possible arguments.
Step 2 greatly weakens the demands on�. switching to a requirement more easily fulfilled by typical KR systems. In a plausible scenario, fragments could cor respond to reports of single inference steps: hence, they might be seen as ATMS (deKleer, 1986) justifications, and the burden of reconstructing full possible argu ments from them might be carried on by an A TMS linked to�. Intuitively, and very roughly, the possible arguments for a. correspond to the environments in the label built by the A TMS for the nodell 'Ya· given a set of justifications communicated by � while looking for possible ways of deducing a.. Asking a. means comput ing a belief value for the labels of 'Ya and of 'Y-a· i) "try to deduce" may involW! firtding all 1M potefltiol tkd��e-lions, or ordy those grOIII Ide d on belUved Jaww ledge ii) Some prectlll l ion must be IIJUn in ortkr for tlte environmeflts to be disioirlt (cf. Laskey-Leimer, 1989) .
Notice that the number of computations performed by the algorithm above is, in general, large. Usual A TMS algorithms for computing labels are exponential in the 11 We write 'Ya to refer to the ATMS node associated to the value "true" for a; correspo ndingly, we also as�ate an ATMS node 'Y -a to the value "false" for a. r A denote as usual the ATMS node associated with the (truth of the) assumption A.
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number of assumptions; also, the number of elements in the labels tend to grow exponentially with the num ber of assumptions. As the number of assumptions in the algorithm above is proportional to the number of Tell t operations, the complexity of computing Workers on DS theory have traditionally been rather unconcerned with the linguistic structures used to rep resent knowledge. The usual attitude consists in leaving to the user the burden of expressing the knowledge rel evant to her problem in the mathematical framework provided by DS theory, i.e. by means far away from the languages most commonly used in knowledge rep resentation. This appears to be a general attitude in the field of uncertain reasoning. In some case, some atten tion has been devoted to the linguistic aspect, as in (Zadeh, 1989) ; however, Zadeh advocates the use of Fuzzy Logic � a KR too l, while we suggest to com bine DS theory with a KR tool. Other frameworks (like some of the existing Expert System Shells) have occa sionally been developed in which both the need of rep resenting knowledge and that of representing uncer tainty have been taken into considerations. In them, however, uncertainty is either part of the language, or it is attached to sentences of the language. In our ap proach, on the contrary, uncertainty is attached to the knowledge itself, rather than to the linguistic structures used to represent it Notice that this approach carries with it an interpretation of uncertainty (or, more pre cisely, epistemic uncertainty) as meta-knowledge about the validity of our knowledge with respect to an intrin sically certain reality: let us consider the two statements a) I am 80% sure that birds fly b) 80% of birds fly statement (a) illustrates our notion of uncertain knowl edge: we can see it as a categorical implication (e.g. "V'x.bird(x)-.fly(x)'') accompanied by (epistemic) uncertainty information; on the contrary, we regard (b) as an example of categorical knowledge which refers to a statistical (but epistemically sure) fact
The main outcome of this paper is the defmition of Belief Bases, abstract data types capable of representing Dempster-Shafer's belief about structured knowledge expressed in some KR language. The "good behaviour" of Belief Bases, as shown by lemma 3.1 and theorem 3.1, guarantees that the properties of both the KR sys tem used and of DS theory are preserved in the combi nation. From the point of view of workers in knowl-12 We would obtain the same result by considering the general proo f-theoretic definition, with the above restriction on the Cl*. edge representation, Belief Bases constitute a tool for attaching a well-grounded and powerful treaunent of uncertainty to a KR system. From the point of view of people fond of DS theory, they provide a means for extending the applicability of DS theory to kinds of knowledge and problems whose formalization in a DS framework would otherwise be far from obvious. To be sure, the addition of simply the full flrst order logic to DS theory (cf. Example 1) is already a non-trivial re sult in terms of the expressiveness of the theory. For instance, the following situation would be hardly ex pressible in a standard use of DS theory (e.g. the multi variate approach): or fmer distinctions (e.g. the distinction between termi nological and assertionaJ knowledge�e example).
The possible world formalization given in this work is related to other possible world accounts given to Dempster-Shafer's theory (e.g. Ruspini, 1986; Fagin and Halpern, 1989) . However, our focus here is the linking of DS theory to an arbitrary KR system, by us ing propositions as a formal bridge: possible worlds are just one possible choice for modelling propositions. Moreover, the above referred accounts are normally re stricted to considering the propositional case, while the approach presented here allows us to extend DS theory to any suitable formal language. On a different side, the A TMS-based algorithm proposed for Belief Bases is extremely similar to some recent proposal to use A TMS for implementing DS theory (D'ambrosio, 1988; Laskey & Lehner, 1989 ). This similarity is intriguing, as both the staning point and the goal of the authors above are apparently different from the ones here: in their proposals, a DS model is mapped into a set of ATMS justifications plus a set of A TMS assumptions with attached probability values. The A TMS is used as a mechanism to perform belief propagation in a sym bolic way; computing then the probability of the A TMS label for the A TMS node representing a value for a variables gives us the belief in that variable taking that value. On the contrary, we are not concerned at all with fitting a general DS model into an ATMS: rather, A TMS is coupled in a standard way to a KR system (or Problem Solver) and used as a computational mecha nism to reconstruct the "possible arguments" (A TMS environments) for a node given the set of justifications produced by the KR system in the deduction process.
These possible arguments constitute, independently of the way they are computed, the basis for the computa tion of belief according to definition 3.3.
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The approach presented here is extensible to other uncertainty calculi. In particular, it is possible to defme a formal framework in which both a specific KR sys tem and a speciflc uncertainty calculus are "plugged in" as modules. This general framework is presented in (Saffiotti, 1990a) , while (Safflotti, 1990b) elaborates on its architecture on the lines hinted at in Section 5.
